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The Ghost of Shaka Zulu: Using
a List Experiment to Measure
Xenophobia in South Africa
by Kennard Noyes

Introduction
Shaka Zulu's reign of bloody supremacy over the part of South Africa that is now
Kwazulu Natal was characterized by ruthless domination of neighboring tribes and
cultures. Although his reign was cut short when he was murdered in 1829, his legacy
of ethnocentrism and antagonism to outsiders has continued to haunt South Africa.
Indeed, strife between tribes and cultures has been a tragic characterization of each
stage of South Africa's history from the times of colonization by the British and the
Dutch Voortrekkers to the injustices of apartheid and the modem waves of xenophobic
violence. The internal strife of the "rainbow nation" has made it the proving ground
for legendary humanitarians such as Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela. At the
end of apartheid, Nelson Mandela led the African National Congress (ANC) era with
the unifying slogan, "one nation, many cultures," and hopes for a new era of unity and
equality throughout the country were high (Ross 1999,1-15). Sadly though. incidents
of xenophobic violence against immigrants, primarily from Zimbabwe, Malawi, and
Somalia, have occurred with increasing regularity since the end of apartheid in 1994
(Misago 2009, 22-28). The xenophobic unrest came to a terrible crescendo in May 2008
when attacks and rioting resulted in sixty-two deaths, millions of dollars in collateral
damage, and over 100,000 people displaced (Misago 2009, 2).
The ANC message of reconciliation and pan-Africanism appears particularly
shallow when juxtaposed with the violence committed against foreigners and the
accusations against ANC officials of making xenophobic remarks to further their own
candidacies (Hudson 2009). Prior to the April 2009 presidential elections in South
Africa, news reports indicated evidence that political parties were using xenophobic
messages to drum up support for their campaigns (Berack 2008). This duality offers a
second, and possibly even more troubling, facet to an already grim situation.
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Current literature regarding xenophobia in South Africa focuses primarily on
aftermath studies of areas affected by sudden eruptions of xenophobic violence. While
these studies make important contributions by focusing only on the epicenters of the
violence, they potentially fail to offer an accurate depiction of xenophobia among South
Africans in general. Granted, ex-post studies of xenophobic violence are one of the
few sure methods of dealing with inherit problems that come when measuring illicit
behaviors and antisocial tendencies. Respondents have a high incentive to lie or hide
their true feelings when confronted with questions regarding socially sensitive issues.
Information gathered regarding commonalities in populations whose actions provide
clear evidence of xenophobia provide one of the only sure methods of gathering
information on demographics that are prone to these kinds of behavior. The puzzle
remains as to the true levels of xenophobia within all sectors of South African society.
This question is particularly poignant given the reports of political leaders exploiting
these tensions. These actions allow individuals who may not participate in violent
uprisings to empower leaders who will be more likely to push xenophobic policies.
This paper attempts to present a clearer representation of xenophobia in South
Africa as well as provide some indications of its potential use in the 2009 presidential
elections through strategic use of a unique survey method. While survey questions
form a standard facet of almost any research design, regular survey methods are only
effective insofar as the researcher can be reasonably sure that the respondents will give
truthful answers. Problems arise when the nature of the question is overly sensitive
or intrusive and provides an incentive for the respondent to answer in a way that
they think is socially acceptable rather than give a response that represents their true
feelings. Researchers have devised several methods to counteract this problem. This
study involves several sensitive issues and uses list questions to avoid the bias that
comes from these social expectations. In this paper, I apply this method to evaluate
true levels of xenophobia and how they affect electoral decisions.
The recent xenophobic violence in South Africa and its possible exploitation
by political parties in their 2009 presidential elections grants this study important
implications for more than just analyses of xenophobia in Africa. Xenophobia is
pervasive throughout many areas of the world, including Europe and North America,
with the rapid influx of immigrants from Northern Africa and Latin America. The
methods this study employs to uncover the true effect of xenophobia in society may
be applied to gain better understanding of xenophobic violence throughout the world.
I will begin by reviewing relevant literature on xenophobia throughout the
world and within South Africa and discuss various issues related to ethnic strength
and its importance to this topic. Second, I present the causal logic between the
mechanisms that result in xenophobic violence and the subsequent political
exploitation of these events. Finally, I outline the experimental model, methodology,
findings, and implications for further research.

Literature Review
Xenophobia is a central issue not only in South Africa but throughout many
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areas of the world. One study defines xenophobia as "the denigration of individuals
or groups based on perceived differences" (Hjerm 1998). While this offers a broad
definition to the issue of xenophobia, it is primarily associated with issues of tension
or violence between an in-group of established residents of one state in opposition to
new.comers, generally immigrants, from a foreign state. Tajfel attributes xenophobic
tenSIOns to the relentless tendency of individuals and groups to categorize their
surroundings (1981, 1982). Peterson lists four separate causation models for ethnic
violence that he sums up as fear, hatred, resentment, and rage. Each of these models
entails one group as the alleged perpetrator of some offense to another group with
the WIll and power to react violently (Peterson 2002). Toft includes the idea that
infringement upon territory is also a common feature in ethnic and xenophobic
conflicts (Toft 2003). Xenophobic and ethnic related disputes have played an
unmistakable role in countless conflicts primarily because the strong feelings related
to nationality and identity serve as powerful activation mechanisms. Also noteworthy
in this section are the numerous studies regarding the role of xenophobic and ethnic
pressures in democratic elections. Global studies regarding the role of xenophobia
in elections have found strong commonalities between xenophobic tensions in the
electorate and corresponding electoral outcomes (Alexseev 2006).
Research specific to the issue of xenophobia in South Africa has increased
steadily in response to the rapid immigration of Zimbabweans and Malawians who
saturate the already overloaded job market in South Africa, which has maintained a
steady rate of well over 20 percent unemployment over the last decade (IMF External
Relations Department 2009). Those who live in townships in the major cities of South
Africa stand to suffer the most from this influx, because the immigrants compete for
the same low-skilled labor positions that they would normally fill (Misago 2009).
The literature regarding ethnic violence and xenophobia within South Africa
has focused primarily on identifying the trouble spots on an ex-post basis. Following
the outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa during May 2008, researchers
from the University of Witswatersrand in Johannesburg attempted to identify why
certain areas seemed more prone to violence than others (Misago 2009). This study
typifies South African research in general on this topic in that each major eruption of
xenophobic violence gives rise to several subsequent studies that attempt to explain the
occurrence. The results depicted in the aforementioned study out of Witswatersrand
mirrored those of an earlier study conducted just after the transition from apartheid
(Harris 2001). These articles carry a common theme of attributing the violence to a
phenomenon that Harris refers to as scapegoating or blaming the foreign minority for
perceived institutional losses such as low wages or poor job opportunities.
Scapegoating is a common feature in xenophobic literature dealing with subjects
from outside of South Africa as well (Lake 1996). International studies of xenophobic
violence also implicate local politics as another aggravating factor that contribute
to xenophobic tension. One study actually indicated that politicians, especiallybut not exclusively-in local contexts, would use the energy that came along with
xenophobic demonstrations to garner more political support (Steinberg 2008). These
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findings are mirrored by studies conducted throughout Europe that show similar
tactics among even such notable European politicians as Margaret Thatcher and
Helmut Kohl (Thranhardt 1995). Other researchers have also indicated that ethnic
violence in South Africa and elsewhere is precipitated by the media as well by
reinforcing poor intercultural communication (Mogekwu 2005). Following this same
vein, Heidi Hudson points out that the history of xenophobic violence within South
Africa constitutes a significant disconnect between South African foreign policy
and domestic politics. Since the end of apartheid, South African foreign policy has
promoted a pan-African movement towards better integration and cooperation;
however, as she points out, this could not contrast more with the steady recurrence
of xenophobic violence that occurs on a more local level within South Africa. Hudson
contends that this rift has the potential of leading to increased civil unrest and violence
in post-apartheid South Africa (2009). This final analysis underlines the importance
of ascertaining the depth of xenophobia in South African society and evaluating
the commitment of leading political parties to their stated objectives of pan-African
cooperation through proper statistical analysis.
In a study that comes closer to the approach that I advocate in this paper,
researchers used survey data to evaluate common perceptions of which sectors of
South African society are more prone to xenophobia. Common knowledge in South
Africa previously seemed to indicate that Zulus and people of lower education were
more likely to exhibit xenophobic tendencies, but this study showed, among other
things, that people of the Xhosa tribe, along with more educated groups, were much
more likely to admit to xenophobic feelings (Solomon 1998). Some of these conclusions
are problematic, since they did not subject their findings to rigorous statistical
analysis. When studying how levels of education affected xenophobic tensions, their
criteria for measuring education could just as easily have been explained by the age of
the respondents rather than their level of education. More importantly, the sensitive
questions they asked respondents were very likely to have elicited biased responses.
While these results are intriguing, my experiment will attempt to extend, evaluate,
and possibly corroborate Solomon's analysis. The primary difference will be my
attempt to improve upon its methodology through randomization techniques and
the implementation of a list experiment.

Theory
While there are many means by which xenophobia becomes a serious issue
throughout society, the mechanism that this study investigates is what researcher
Bronwyn Harris refers to as "scapegoating" or blaming the foreign minority for
perceived institutional losses such as low wages or poor job market (2001). This effect
seems to be most common in areas of the world that experience rapid immigrant
influxes. Though this study focuses on the dramatic events taking place in South Africa,
the scapegoat effect is readily apparent in many countries. The massive movement
of Mexican immigrants into the U.s., African immigration into western Europe, and
Haitian immigrants swarming into the Dominican Republic, are all examples of cases
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that have resulted in scapegoating and have erupted into violent demonstrations
against the foreign minorities that resident groups blame for their misfortunes.
Often, the increased competition for jobs and other resources that arises in
response to a massive influx of immigrants result in violence. This violence is caused
because resident groups believe they are more entitled to the resources that may
have been more plentiful prior to the entry of the foreign group. Although differing
from case to case, these violent demonstrations are often condemned by both foreign
and domestic groups and are generally punished by law (excluding the cases in which
they are instigated by governmental forces). Given South Africa's unique record in ethnic
conflicts stemming from its tragic history of colonization and the legacy of apartheid,
there is reason to believe the citizens are aware of public opinions and social norms
regarding bigotry and xenophobia. These considerations indicate the necessity of a
method to circumvent the social response bias. Even if we disregard the effect of the
social norms and expectations within South African society itself, there is reason to
believe that respondents in a survey experiment administrated by foreign researchers
will be more reluctant to reveal views that they expect will make them appear
xenophobic or bigoted.
Due to the highly charged nature of xenophobic conflicts, politicians have often
appealed to public sentiment on both sides of this issue to further their own political
interests. While sound immigration policies are certainly a defensible campaign
platform for responsible candidates, problems arise when candidates attempt to jockey
for more support by continually shifting to more and more dramatic positions in
response to xenophobic riots in certain areas. These concerns give rise to two primary
research issues regarding the evaluation of the true levels of xenophobia in South Africa
and whether these latent xenophobic feelings evidence themselves in the electoral
outcomes. Logic suggests that lower educated and lower income residents would be
more vulnerable to displacement in employment due to influxes of immigrants with
similar qualifications and backgrounds. Also, these same groups would be the most
likely to respond to political candidates running with platforms that included antiimmigration measures or ethnocentric messages.

Hypotheses
There are two main hypotheses associated with this paper:
Hypothesis 1: As education and income decrease, indications of xenophobia
will increase due to greater employment vulnerability through encroachment by
immigrants and other outsiders.
Hypothesis 2: The strata of South African society that show more xenophobic
tension will be more likely to allow this tension to affect their voting behavior.

Experimental Design
This experiment took place between June and August 2009 throughout three
townships in South Africa. We selected the townships based on the highest probability
of selecting a representative sample of the population of South Africa. The townships
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we chose were Davy ton, near Johannesburg; Mdantsane, outside of East London; and
Umlazi, located near Durban. South Africa is populated by nine major native ethnic
cultures: Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Sotho, Swati, Tsonga, Tswana, Ndebele, and Venda. By
far the largest groups are Zulu and Xhosa. Umlazi is primarily a Zulu township,
Mdantsane is Xhosa, and Davy ton is as close to a representative sample of the other
ethnic groups as is possible to find in one township. In all, our sample included 667
participants resembling the general distribution of ethnic groups generally seen
throughout South Africa.

Recruitment
To recruit a random sample within the townships, we hired research assistants
from local universities who were familiar with the areas in the study and divided their
respective townships into various zones and districts. We randomly assigned zones,
districts, routes within the districts, and starting houses within the routes. Then we
instructed the research assistants to knock on every third door starting from the house
we randomly assigned (varying the times in which they conducted the recruitment
each day). They then randomly selected an adult member of the household that they
would invite to participate in the study. They would inform the potential respondent
that he or she could earn up to R60 (about $6) if he or she participated in a research
study regarding South Africa's ethnic groups. If the respondent agreed, he or she was
given an invitation to come to a local school where the experiment would take place.
The invitation had his or her own name on it, which matched his or her scheduled
time, to ensure that the correct person came at each time. When the respondents came
in for their appointments, they were instructed in how to use the basic computer
program that presented each respondent with an anonymous survey to ascertain
basic background information and randomly assigned one of three conditions for
each list experiment.
List Experiments
As previously stated, problems associated with falsified responses to sensitive
issues in survey questions have led researchers to devise several means of circumventing
the problem to discover the true feelings of a respondent. When confronted with
questions that the respondent feels uncomfortable answering truthfully for fear of
self-incrimination, there is no perfect means of discerning whether or not the subject
is lying. Apart from refining the wording of the question, researchers have attempted
randomized response methods, implicit association tests, and bogus lie detectors to
remove the response bias (Corstange 2008; 47, Kuklinski 1997; 327). One fairly recent
method, "the list experiment," effectively removes the response bias by granting the
respondent perfect anonymity while still allowing researchers to identify key factors
in the experiment. The list method gives a control and treatment group at least two
different lists that share three elements in common (Appendix 1). Each list typically
contains two or three statements that are the same and the treatment list contains one
extra test statement. The respondents indicate how many of the items in a list apply to
them given the requirements of the question. In this experiment, respondents in both
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the control and treatment groups saw the following question on a computer-based
survey: How many of the following make you angry? This question was followed by
one of two lists. The control list contains four items and the treatment lists contain five
items, four of which match the items in the control list:
Politicians who do not keep their promises
The unemployment rate
High prices (i.e., food and gas prices)
High crime rates
The final point was only included in the test groups: Immigrants moving into your
community.
This method is much more unthreatening to respondents-feelings are kept
anonymous and the response bias is avoided. Because they report the total number of
issues that affect them rather than specifying certain issues, participants are less likely
to feel compelled to give deceptive responses.
This table shows the arrangements of list questions to their various treatments.
List

Xenophobia treatment

Election treatment

List 1
How many of the
following make you
angry?

(Treatment 1-1)
Immigrants moving into your
community

(Treatment 1-2)
Having a president who
is not of the same tribal
ethnicity

List 2
How many of the
following influenced
your vote in the recent
presidential elections?

(Treatment 2-1)
Promises made by candidates
or parties to take measures to
counter immigration

(Treatment 2-2)
Ethnicity of candidate

Data may then be analyzed using simple comparison of means tests, because any
difference between the mean numbers of statements reported as making them angry
may be attributed to the addition of the test phrase. When we break these results
down between different criteria on ethnicity, locale, age group, and various relevant
socioeconomic factors, we will ascertain ethnic and xenophobic biases throughout a
broad range of South African society.
In this case, we may use the results of these experiments to determine not only
which groups of South Africans are more likely to show xenophobic tendencies but
also whether these sentiments are strong enough to become a factor in their voting
decisions. Since there were reports that some political parties may have attempted to
use xenophobia as a means of securing more support in the townships, this method
may be helpful in determining which parties the most xenophobic people were
likely to support. Also, given the tendency toward violence against immigrants, this
information may be helpful in identifying which sections of township society may be
more prone to xenophobic demonstrations.

Data Analysis
The primary goal of this analysis is to evaluate the true level of xenophobia
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throughout different stratifications of South African society through strategic use of list
experiment data. We compared the mean responses of each stratification against the
appropriate population mean value for the control group by using the responses from
the survey section of the study regarding ethnic culture, political affiliation, etc. This
allowed me to run multiple regressions using important control variables such as the
aforementioned ethnic strength variable, as well as a welfare variable we constructed
through questions about different appliances present in their respective households.

Results
The results of the t-tests show the groups with statistically significant xenophobic
biases, as well as those who indicate that this influences their political decisions.
The results from the first treatment of the first list question are recorded in Table l.
Recall from the earlier discussion that this question asked respondents how many
items in the list made them angry. The treatment that is represented in Table 1 is
the statement regarding immigrants moving into their community. The results from
this table indicate strongly that residents of townships throughout South Africa are
clearly biased against foreigners moving into their neighborhoods.
Table 2 shows the same question with the treatment statement regarding whether
having a president who is not of their same tribal ethnicity makes them angry. These
results are somewhat more interesting, because it approaches the issue of ethnic
enmity between tribes rather than just the xenophobic issue that has been the focus
of this paper thus far.
While the sample sizes of some of the underrepresented ethnic cultures prevents
drawing strong conclusions from their implications, these results clearly indicate
Zulus are very strongly biased against having a president who is not of their own
ethnic culture. This finding is also fairly significant for the Xhosa group. This bears
strong implications for the future of the ANC, particularly given the ascension of
Jacob Zuma as president-the first Zulu leader since the end of apartheid.
The results in Table 3 are from the first treatment's second list question that
asked respondents to indicate how many of the issues were relevant in their decisions
during the recent presidential elections regardless of whether they actually voted or
not. The treatment in this case was whether promises made by candidates or parties
to take measures to counter immigration were influential in their vote.
Surprisingly, these results are more significant for the Xhosa Party and the
ANC. Earlier reports had indicated that Zulus and the COPE Party were more
commonly associated with xenophobic biases. Conversely, this table indicates that
even though members of the ANC overall indicate that promises to stem the flow of
immigrants were an important factor, this effect is not mirrored in the results for the
Zulu people. The Xhosa tribe members, on the other hand, indicated strongly that
promises to put an end to immigration were an important factor in their decisionmaking process.
The implications of these findings are particularly interesting with respect to the
outcomes of the past preSidential elections and subsequent rise of Jacob Zuma as
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the first Zulu president of South Africa. The Xhosa response could be an indication
of possible tribal discomfort from losing the prestige or possibly some degree of
perceived trust or control from having a fellow Xhosa in the presidency.
Table 3: Treatment 2-1:
Promises made by candidates or parties to take measures to counter
immigration influenced vote (by subgroup) vs. control mean of population
TEST
Treatment 2-1

N

Control Mean

List Mean

220

2.9498 (1.126)

3.218 (1.5638)

Difference of
Means
-1.955

Pedi

13

2.9498 (1.126)

3.23 (1.423)

-.772

Tsonga

\I

2.9498 (1.126)

3(1.732)

-.126

Xhosa

77

2.9498 (1.126)

3.3896** (1.46)

-2.5

Zulu

89

2.9498 (1.126)

3.067 (1.698)

-.662

Christian

148

2.9498 (1.126)

3.142 (1.494)

-1.314

Traditional

35

2.9498 (1.126)

2.971 (1.505)

-.093

Other Religion

13

2.9498 (1.126)

3.538 (1.127)

-1.6382

Male

1\7

2.9498 (1.126)

3.22 (1.526)

-1.7336

Female

102

2.9498 (1.126)

3.206 (1.619)

-1.528

Eastern Cape

60

2.9498 (1.126)

3.483*** (1.467)

-2.78

Kwazulunatal

76

2.9498 (1.126)

3.0658 (1.7075)

-.622

Guateng

93

2.9498 (1.126)

3.183 (1.518)

-1.39

Limpopo

\I

2.9498 (1.126)

3.273 (1.191)

-.828

ANC

191

2.9498 (1.126)

3.361*** (1.473)

-3.013

Johannesburg

94

2.9498 (1.126)

3.255319* (1.4806)

-1.8463

Durban

72

2.9498(1.126)

2.9861\1 (1.699155)

-.1920

East London

54

2.9498 (1.126)

3.462963** (1.50 II)

-2.5577

*** p<O.Ol, ** p<o.os, * p<O.l

Standard Deviations in Parentheses. Deleted due to insufficient sample: Venda, Tswana, Ndebele, Sotho,
Swati, Muslim, Hindu, Western Cape, Northern Cape, Freestate, Northwest, Mpumalanga, ACDF, IFF,
Other Party.

Table 4 shows a logit regression indicating the likelihood that a member of any
given tribe self-identifies as an adherent to the ANC. While the t-statistic chart for the
second iteration of the second list question shows very little meaningful indication
that the ethnicity of the candidate was an influential factor in their voting behavior,
the regression analysis of this question did provide some intriguing results. The
regressions indicate that the mother's schooling is the single most important factor in
determining the likelihood that the individuals would consider ethnicity an important
factor in determining their voting behavior. The inferred causal mechanism behind
this is that as the primary caretaker of a child becomes more educated, they are better
able to impart more cosmopolitan views into their children.
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Table 4: Likelihood of membership in ANC by ethnicity
VARIABLES
Zulu
Xhosa
Venda
Tswana
Tsonga
Swati
Sotho
Pedi
Ndebele
Constant
Observations
R-squared

ANC
2.480** (1.127)
3.266*** (1.136)
2.996* (1.565)
2.079* (1.225)
3.303*** (1.216)
2.821 ** (1.224)
3.689*** (1.27l)
3.638*** (1.235)
2.890** (1.247)
-1.386 (1.118)
665

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<O.OS, * p<O.l

Table 5: Dependent Variable: Treatment 2-2:
Ethnicity of candidate (influenced vote)
VARIABLES
Father's Educaiton
Mother's Education
Age
Gender
Cosmopolitan
Uninformed voter
Income
Living Conditions
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
list 2-2
0.049 (0.069)
-0.274*** (0.074)

3.410*** (0.508)
198
0.072

(2)
list 2-2
0.061 (0.072)
-0.285*** (0.080)
-0.009 (O.OlD)
0.170 (0.230)
-0.107 (0.077)
0.005 (0.043)
O.Oll (0.086)
0.005 (0.078)
3.575*** (1.156)
186
0.085

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<O.OS, * p<O.l
Missing values for dependent variable dropped

The regression analyses for the first list treatments show strikingly similar trends.
Before the application of the interaction variable between the ethnicity and the strength
indicator, the valu~s are nearly all insignificant; however, when the interaction variable combining strength to identity is used, many more of the ethnicities are significant. In other words, as a people identify more strongly with their own culture,
not only are they more likely to react angrily to foreigners moving into their neighborhoods, but they also report being less supportive of presidents who are not of their
own tribal identity.
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Table 6: Dependent Variable: Treatment 1-1:
Immigrants moving into your community makes you angry
Dependent Variable: Treatment 1-2:
A president who is not of your tribal ethnicity makes you angry
VARIABLES
Zulu
Xhosa
Venda
Tswana
Tsonga
Swati
Sotho

Pedi

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

lisC1-1

list_1-1
*strength

List_1-1
*strength

list_1-2

list_1-2
*strength

List_1-2
*strength

-0.433
(1.036)
-0.281
(1.039)
0.000
(0.000)
0.500
(1.255)
0.300
(1.123)
-0.750
(1.146)
-0.682
(1.114)

0.516**
(0.212)
0.590***
(0.220)
0.548*
(0.313)
0.954***
(0.348)
0.726***
(0.251)
0.468*
(0.283)
0.475*
(0.255)

0.466**
(0.219)
0.546**
(0.229)
0.533*
(0.319)
0.927**
(0.358)
0.678***
(0.259)
0.425
(0.294)
0.432
(0.269)

-0.200

(1.123)

0.587**
(0.246)
0.711***
(0.242)

3.500***
(1.025)
217
0.033

1.353*
(0.697)
217
0.062

0.560**
(0.255)
0.671***
(0.250)
0.033
(0.054)
-0.002
(0.008)
-0.186
(0.173)
1.382*
(0.803)
215
0.065

(1.123)

Ndebele

0.300

Welfare
Age
Gender
Constant
Observations
R-squared

-1.893
(1.458)
-2.173
(1.459)
-3.000*
(1.776)
-1.400
(1.588)
-2.727*
(1.514)
-2.000
(1.538)
-1.000
(1.528)

-2.000
(1.494)

0.408**
(0.201)
0.337*
(0.199)
0.080
(0.341)
0.522*
(0.273)
0.188
(0.241)
0.404
(0.267)
0.737***
(0.261)
0.364
(0.247)

-1.200

0.650**

(1.588)

(0.298)

5.000***
(1.450)
216
0.063

1.734***
(0.661)
213
0.066

0.368*
(0.213)
0.295
(0.210)
0.048
(0.352)
0.482*
(0.284)
0.175
(0.256)
0.358
(0.280)
0.698**
(0.273)
0.292
(0.262)
0.607*
(0.310)
0.029
(0.054)
0.001
(0.009)
0.000
(0.210)
1.616*
(0.843)
207
0.063

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<O.Ol, ** p<O.OS, * p<O.l
Missing values for dependent variable dropped

Conclusion
The implications of these findings are quite diverse. I have found evidence that
many of the supporters of the ANC show strong xenophobic tendencies. This indicates
that those people who would have been swayed by campaign speeches promising
stronger stances on immigration would probably have granted their support to the
ANC. While this does not conclusively attribute exploitation of xenophobia to the ANC
candidates, it leaves that possibility open for further research.
This study also shows that the general populace of the townships throughout
South Africa is likely to look negatively on foreigners who move into their
neighborhoods rather than the extreme few as was previously thought. These
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findings present avenues for future research to obtain more data regarding some of
the underrepresented ethnic groups, religions, and geographic areas to discover their
full effect.
Given that the purpose of this study was primarily the exploration of uncharted
territory rather than an attempt to present a completed roadmap of xenophobic
violence in South Africa, the results indicate the usefulness of this particular
methodology in evaluating this issue. Perhaps, more importantly, the findings
presented in this paper show that xenophobia in South Africa is not limited to the
perpetrators of violent hate crimes against foreign immigrants. This conclusion leads
to the possibility for future research to establish whether xenophobic feelings that are
shared by the general population are more likely to encourage extremists to commit
violent acts than situations where the extremists form a more marginalized segment
of society that may feel bounded by expectations of public disapproval.
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APPENDIX 1
List Question 1: Xenophobic and ethnic tensions in general
Please read the following statements and, in the space provided, note HOW MANY of them
make you angry? DO NOT INDICATE WHICH ONES, only how many.
Politicians who do not keep their promises
The unemployment rate
High prices (i.e., food and gas prices)
High crime rates
Number of statements that make you angry_ _
The final point only included in the test groups:
Treatment 1-1: Immigrants moving into your community
or
Treatment 1-2: Having a president who is not of your tribal ethnicity.
List Question 2: Xenophobic and ethnic tensions in the Election
.
Please read the following statements and, in the space provided, note HOW MANY mfluenced
your vote in the elections? DO NOT INDICATE WHICH ONES, only how many.
Crime reduction issues
Your party affiliation
Poverty reduction promises
Housing issues
Number of statements that influenced your vote_ _
The final point only included in the test groups:
Treatment 2-1: Promises made by candidates or parties to take measures to counter immigration.
Treatment 2-2: Ethnicity of candidate
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APPENDIX 2
Remaining tables with results that were not discussed in the text
Treatment 2-2:
Ethnicity of candidate influenced vote (by subgroup) vs. control mean of population
TEST
List 2 Control
List two treatment 2
Ndebele
Pedi
Sotho
Swati
Tsonga
Tswana
Venda
Xhosa
Zulu
Christian
Muslim
Traditional
Hindu
Other Religion
Male
Female
Western Cape
Eastern Cape
Northern Cape
Freestate
Kwazulunatal
Northwest
Guateng
Mpumalanga
Limpopo
ACDP
ANC
COPE
IFP
PAC
SACP
UCDP
UDM
Other Party

N

MEAN

211
200
9
10
11
6
12
2
3
72
75
148
3
37

2.9498
3.16
3.667
2.7
3.363636
2.5
2.583
3.5
4.33
3.278
3.1067
3.14189
4.667
2.973

Standard
Deviation
1.186
1.521834
1.414
1.4181
1.62928
1.76
1.676
2.12132
.5773503
1.54
1.325
1.4938
.57735
1.675

12
97
103
4
67

2.9839
3.2195
3.106796
2.75
3.402985

1.37895
1.4522
1.5899
2.061553
1.45706

-1.6803
-1.6394
-.9471
.3094
-2.4612'

3
57

3.67
3.2982

1.5275
1.4634

-.9729
-1.7835

85
10
8

2.8947
3.6
3.375

1.551
1.5055
1.5059

.32
-1.5753
-.9273

171
7
8
2
2

3.1228
4
3.25
2.5
3

1.5077
1.4142
1.58114
2.12132
2.828

-1.2799
-2.1542
-.6532
.4985
-.0554

1
8

4
3

1.773

-.1086

'Indicates significance of 95 percent or better
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Difference
of Means
-1.5264
-1.658
-.607
-1.0427
-.8498
-.9585
-.9585
-1.889
-1.794
-.8805
-1.3141
-2.3438'
-.0977

SIGMA
Dependent Variable: Treatment 2-1:
Promises made by candidates or parties to take measures to counter immigration
(influenced vote)
(I)
list 2-1

(2)
list 2-1

(3)
list 2-1

Zulu

-0.933 (1.581 )

-0.083 (0.244)

-0.177 (0.258)

Xhosa

-0.610 (1.582)

0.011 (0.250)

-0.113 (0.267)

Venda

0.500 ( 1.925)

0.171 (0.458)

0.087 (0.470)

Tswana

-0.143 (1.681 )

0.156 (0.290)

0.038. (0.305)

Tsonga

-1.000 (1.642)

-0.054 (0.286)

-0.102 (0.305)

Swati

-1.111 (1.657)

-0.156 (0.303)

-0.264 (0.316)

Sotho

-1.429 (1.681)

-0.318 (0.328)

-0.451 (0.343)

Pedi

-0.769 (1.631 )

-0.018 (0.296)

-0.129 (0.314)

Ndebele

-0.250 (1.758)

0.125 (0.325)

VARIABLES

0.007 (0.337)

Welfare

-0.046 (0.059)

Age

0.010 (0.010)

Gender
Constant

0.038 (0.224)
4.000** (1.572)

3.340*** (0.1103)

220

218

Observations
R-squared

0.031
0.029
Standard errors In parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<O.05, *p<O.l
Missing values for dependent variable dropped

3.768*** (0.945)
213
0.038

Dependent Variable: Treatment 2-2:
Ethnicity of candidate (influenced vote)
VARIABLES
Zulu
Xhosa
Venda
Tswana
Tsonga
Swati
Sotho
Pedi
Ndebele
Welfare
Age
Gender
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(2)
list_2-2
*strength
0.075 (0.231)
0.114 (0.233)
0.414 (0.329)
0.169 (0.446)
-0.054 (0.252)
-0.062 (0.320)
0.161 (0.284)
0.018 (0.286)
0.223 (0.274)

(1)
list_2-2
-1.227
-1.056
0.000
-0.833
-1.750*
-1.833*
-0.970
-1.633
-0.667

(0.898)
(0.898)
(0.000)
(1.392)
(0.984)
(1.078)
(0.993)
(1.003)
(1.016)

2.870*** (0.759)
198
0.026

4.333*** (0.880)
200
0.037

Standard errors In parentheses

*** p<O.Ol, ** p<O.OS, * p<O.l
Missing values for dependent variable dropped
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(3)
list_2-2
*strength
0.055 (0.248)
0.074 (0.249)
0.389 (0.342)
0.157 (0.460)
-0.058 (0.265)
-0.070 (0.338)
0.134 (0.300)
-0.052 (0.305)
0.201 (0.290)
-0.037 (0.074)
-0.001 (0.009)
0.069 (0.232)
3.248*** (1.044)
194
0.027
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Table 1: Treatment 1-1:
Immigrants moving into your community makes you angry vs. control mean
TEST
Treatment 1-1
Ndebele
Pedi
Sotho
Tsonga
Xhosa
Zulu
Christian
Traditional
Other Religion
Male
Female
Eastern Cape
Kwazulunatal
Guateng
Mpumalanga
Limpopo
ANC
Johannesburg
Durban
East London
Other Party

N
217
10
10
11
10
73
89
165
39
12
113
103
58
78
83
12
13
182
86
73
58
10

Control Mean
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)

List Mean
3.194*** (.098)
3.8*** (.359)
3.3** (.3958)
2.818*** (1.888)
3.8** (.249)
3.219*** (1.493)
3.0674** (1.491)
3.1576*** (1.4977)
3.41 *** (1.245)
3.083 (1.3789)
3.15*** (1.434)
3.2524*** (1.46667)
3.14*** (1.47)
3.089*** (1.47)
3.289*** (1.366)
3.583*** (.996)
3.077 (1.875)
3.198*** (1.428)
3.279*** (1.402)
3.082192*** (1.507)
3.2069*** (1.448)
3.1 (1.214)

Difference of Means
-5
-3.282
-1.97
-.7295
-3.317
-3.886
-3.21
-4.38
-4.1486
-1.5255
-4.037
-4.55
-3.19
-3.2298
-4.61
-2.98
-1.5797
-4.897
-4.5559
-3.0914
-3.572
-1.426

*** p<O.Ol, ** p<O.os, * p<O.l
Standard Deviations in Parentheses Deleted due to insufficient sample: Swati, Tswana, Venda, Muslim, Hindu,
Western Cape, Northern Cape, Freestate, Northwest, ACDP, COPE, PAC, SACp, IFP.

Table 2: Treatment 1-2:
Having a president who is not of the same tribal ethnicity
makes you angry (by subgroup) vs. control mean

l

TEST
Treatment 1-2
Pedi
Sotho
Tsonga
Xhosa
I Zulu

N
216
16
9
11
75
'84

I

Control Mean
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54(1.186)
2.54 (1.186)
2.54 (1.186)

List Mean
3.019*** (1.47)
3 (.3873)
4*** (.408)
2.273 (1.27)
2.8267* (1.519)
I 3.12*** (1.43) I

Difference of Means
-3.63
-1.455
-3.6
-.756
-1.642
-3.444

*** p<O.Ol, ** p<O.OS, * p<O.l

Standard Deviations in Parentheses Deleted due to insufficient sample: Venda, Tswana, Ndebele, Swati.
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